AbsTrAcT: This paper investigates the hypothesis that there is a causal relation between speculative pressure and real exchange rate overvaluation, banking-sector fragility, and the level of international reserves in Turkey. An autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) boundstesting procedure and Granger causality within vector error-correction models (VECM) are applied to the period after the liberalization of capital flows (August 1989-August 2006. The results of the ARDL bounds test support the theory that exchange market pressure is in a long-run equilibrium relation with the three hypothesized variables over the sample period. On the other hand, the results of the short-run and long-run Granger causality tests indicate the existence of Granger causality running from the three variables to exchange market pressure. The findings further suggest that a feedback relation exists between banking-sector fragility and exchange market pressure.
Turkey is one of the emerging market economies that bought into the promises of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-prompted financial liberalization policies in the 1980s, which have exposed these economies to speculative short-term capital movements and currency crises. Following the liberalization of the capital account in August 1989, the Turkish economy experienced currency crises in 1994 and 2001, as well as a number of unsuccessful speculative attacks that were fended off by the intervention of the Turkish Central Bank.
This study examines the causal relation between exchange market pressure and a set of variables for Turkey within a parsimonious second generation-type currency crisis model introduced by Sachs et al. (1996) . The model suggests that an economy is more likely to experience a currency crisis if the real exchange is appreciated, the banking system is fragile, and the level of international reserves does not sufficiently cover liquid liabilities. The present study tests the validity of this framework for Turkey between August 1989 and August 2006, which spans various unique types of exchange rate regimes. The crisis of 1994 differed from the crises experienced in other emerging economies, as it erupted during a managed float, rather than a pegged exchange rate regime. From a policy perspective, an econometric analysis of exchange market pressure in such an economy could offer policy implications not only for Turkish policymakers, but also for their peers in other emerging economies.
The present study contributes to the existing literature primarily on the methodological front, as it uses both the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds-testing procedure and Granger causality analysis. Granger causality is applicable only if it has been established that a long-run relation exists between the underlying series. Therefore, before Mete Feridun (mete.feridun@gmail.com) is an assistant professor in the Department of Banking and Finance, Eastern Mediterranean University, Gazi Magosa, Mersin, Turkey. The author is indebted to David T. Llewellyn, Eric J. Pentecost, Salih T. Katircioglu, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. testing causality, it is necessary to examine whether the underlying series are cointegrated. Nonetheless, in the literature on exchange market pressure, conventional cointegration tests, such as the Engle and Granger (1987) and the Johansen (1988) tests, are not applicable due to the time-series properties of the indices that are used to proxy pressure in the exchange market. The novelty of the present study is that it applies an ARDL testing procedure (Pesaran et al. 2001) to test the existence of a long-run relation between underlying series. This technique is known to yield valid results regardless of the orders of integration of the underlying variables (Pesaran et al. 2001) . As a result, it allows the inclusion of a stationary exchange market pressure index in the analysis, facilitating the use of Granger causality tests to examine the causal relation between exchange market pressure and a set of macroeconomic variables.
Literature Review
The existing empirical studies in the literature on exchange market pressure differ vastly in the choice of methodology, variables, and sample of countries. These studies have yielded mixed results; general disagreement remains on the causes of exchange market pressure and currency crises. The econometric techniques used in the related literature are generally poor, falling behind new developments in econometrics, such as cointegration analysis, vector error-correction models, bounds-testing procedures, and Granger causality tests. As Rose explains:
we [economists] simply do not have a very good understanding of what causes crises [currency crises]. We are therefore unable to provide policymakers with good crisis prevention techniques, early warning systems, and so forth. Theory is ahead of empirics in this area of economics, but both are in terrible shape. (2001, p. 75) In retrospect, the widely used empirical methodologies in the related literature, such as the signals approach (Kaminsky et al. 1997) , limited dependent models (Frankel and Rose 1996) , linear probability models (Moreno 1995) , artificial neural networks (Nag and Mitra 1999) , and Markow regime-switching models (Jeanne and Masson 2000) , are all subject to some criticism for a number of technical and theoretical reasons. Their results are looked upon with skepticism.
The literature on speculative pressure in the exchange market and currency crises contains only a handful of country-specific empirical studies on Turkey. These studies generally focus on the currency crises of 1994 and 2000-2001 and do not consider unsuccessful speculative attacks. An exception to this is a study by Parlaktuna (2005) , who applies Girton and Roper's (1977) exchange market pressure model to Turkey from 1993 to 2004. She obtains strong evidence of a negative relation between domestic credit and exchange market pressure. She also finds that the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey absorbed most of the speculative pressure by using up its foreign reserves. This is the only existing study on Turkey-that we know of-that does not turn exchange market pressure into a dichotomous variable and that considers unsuccessful speculative attacks. The rest of the studies convert the index into a dichotomous 0-1 variable and examine the causes of currency crises using various methods. These studies have yielded mixed results. Ucer et al. (1998) use the signals approach for the period from 1986 to 1999 and find that short-term foreign debt and weak exports relative to imports increased the economy's vulnerability to currency crises. Kibritciog¬ lu et al. (1998) use a methodology similar to Kaminsky et al.'s (1997) signals approach, called the leading indicators approach, for the period from 1986 to 1998. They compare the behavior of a number of indicators with that of a currency crisis index. Using this approach, the authors identify terms of trade and the market-determined exchange rate over the official exchange rate as leading indicators of currency crisis.
Based on a relatively less rigorous empirical investigation, Özkan (2005) also uses a broad set of explanatory variables to study the crisis of 2001 using data from 1990 to 2001. The author concludes that a weak external position, weak fiscal position, and the weakness of the financial sector were the reasons behind the crisis. Atasoy and Saxena (2006) estimate the equilibrium real exchange rate for Turkey, finding that the lira was overvalued before the crises in 1994 and 2001. Focusing more on the collapse of Turkey's IMF-supported exchange rate-based stabilization program, Akyurek (2006) argues that the failure of the Turkish government to progress significantly toward a sustainable fiscal regime was the primary factor behind the crisis of 2001. However, Capoglu (2004) argues that the program failed because it did not address the possible negative effect of institutional conditions, such as the absence of an independent and effective regulatory agency in the banking sector and the circumstances under which the Treasury carried out its borrowing. Analyzing the effect of globalization on the Turkish economy, Alper and Onis (2003) argue that the economy was dependent on capital inflows, and this dependence paved the way to the currency crises of 1994 and 2001.
Attempting to devise an early warning system to predict currency crises, Mariano et al. (2004) implement a Markov regime-switching model from 1990 to 2002. The authors report that their model could successfully forecast crises. In addition, using this approach, the authors identify the real exchange rate, international reserves, and domestic credit growth as the most important determinants of crises.
In a recent study, Feridun (2007) investigates the determinants of crises using both the signals approach and logit regressions from 1980 to 2006. He obtains evidence that banking-sector fragility, short-term debt relative to international reserves, and the ratio of bank reserves to bank assets were the most significant leading indicators. He also finds that external variables, such as the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) and U.S. Treasury bill rate, were also significant. Financial liberalization rendered the Turkish economy vulnerable to currency crises.
The broader literature also contains a large number of multicountry studies that include Turkey (see, e.g., Komulainen and Lukkarila 2003; Kumar et al. 2003) . Due to the heterogeneity of crises in each country, the results of the studies cannot be used reliably to draw specific conclusions regarding the crises in Turkey. Nonetheless, the results of the studies generally confirm the importance of certain variables, such as currency overvaluation, international reserves, domestic credit growth, and variables that proxy weaknesses in the financial sector.
Overall, the existing studies in the literature can be criticized on several grounds. They focus on crisis episodes and pay no attention to speculative pressure in the exchange market that does not necessarily result in a currency crisis. Moreover, the findings of these studies are questionable, as the transformation of the exchange market pressure index into a dummy variable results in considerable loss of information about the intensity of exchange market pressure. This is particularly a handicap for a single-country study, as the number of crisis observations (values of 1) after such a transformation remain very small compared to observations of tranquil times (values of 0).
The studies also generally lack a theoretical foundation. Although they give the impression that they select their variables from the various theoretical models in the literature, none of them specifically test the validity of a particular theoretical model for Turkey. In this respect, this study aims to fill this gap in the related literature by examining the causal relation between exchange market pressure and a set of variables for Turkey within the theoretical framework suggested by Sachs et al. (1996) .
Financial Liberalization of the Turkish Economy
In Turkey, attempts at financial liberalization began with an IMF-backed structuraladjustment reform program known as the January 24 decisions, put into effect on January 24, 1980, to restore the economy, which had suffered a major debt crisis from 1977 to 1980. In 1984, the foreign exchange regime was liberalized and banks were allowed to accept foreign currency deposits from citizens and to engage in foreign transactions. In 1986, the Turkish government began issuing Treasury bills and government bonds for the first time to borrow in international markets. In August 1989, the capital account was fully liberalized and the full convertibility of the Turkish lira was recognized.
The liberalization of the capital account in August 1989 resulted in a surge in capital inflows, with the subsequent appreciation of the Turkish lira by 22 percent by the end of the same year. Consequently, the growth rate of exports slowed and that of total imports rose, resulting in a current account deficit. In the meantime, the pressure on the exchange rate and the interest rates, as well as the open position of the banking system, increased the demand for U.S. dollars. At the end of 1993, public-sector debt stock and deficits as a percentage of GDP reached record high levels and the burden of interest payments increased (Özatay 1996) . To avoid slowing growth prior to the forthcoming local election of the governments in March 1994, the government decided to control interest rates.
Starting in 1993, the government shifted its policy from bond finance to money finance. Yet during this period, several Treasury bill auctions were cancelled and the Treasury started to rely on short-term advances from the central bank (Kibritciog¬ lu et al. 1998) . In January 1994, international credit rating agencies lowered Turkey's sovereign debt rating, which shortly triggered a panic in financial markets. The banks rushed to the foreign exchange market to close their positions and overnight interest rates soared. The central bank intervened in the foreign exchange market to defend the exchange rate and exhausted half of its reserves (Celasun 1998) . These events resulted in a currency crash in April 1994, with the Turkish lira depreciating by more than 50 percent against the U.S. dollar.
The crisis of April 1994 differed from those in most of the other emerging economies in that the exchange rate system in Turkey when the crisis erupted was a managed float rather than a fixed exchange rate regime, which almost all other emerging markets were operating under when currency crises occurred in the 1990s. In the aftermath of the crisis, the Turkish government continued to pursue the same exchange rate policy, but it announced a new stabilization program on April 5, 1994. Shortly thereafter, a standby program was signed with the IMF. However, it soon became clear that the government was not strongly behind this program and the agreement ended in 1995. In July 1998, the Turkish government started another disinflation program under IMF guidance. The program improved the inflation rate and fiscal imbalances somewhat, but it failed to relieve the pressures on the interest rates (Ucer et al. 1998 ).
In the meantime, the Russian debt crisis of August 1998, the general elections in April 1999, and two earthquakes in August and October 1999 led to a deterioration of the fis-cal balance of the public sector. The global panic caused by the Russian debt crisis led to a significant outflow of capital from Turkey in the last quarter of 1998. The central bank avoided a liquidity crunch by sterilizing the outflow, but interest rates soared. As a result, Turkey embarked upon an exchange rate-based disinflation program backed by a three-year standby agreement with the IMF at the end of 1999 to reduce the interest rates and inflation. With this program, the Turkish lira was fixed to a U.S. dollar-German mark basket through a crawling-peg exchange rate regime. It was announced that the exchange rate would be allowed to fluctuate in a continuously widening band after eighteen months. Even though the program seemed to be on track, with steadily falling inflation and interest rates, an overvalued exchange rate and high real interest rates were still a problem (Emre and Önis* 2002) . Furthermore, the program relied exclusively on speculative short-term capital inflows as the source of liquidity. This rendered the economy vulnerable to speculative attacks.
In the second half of 2000, the opposition of some parties inside the government to privatizing certain state enterprises led to a general suspicion that the program was about to end. Market expectations were exacerbated by the news that some of the commercial banks had financial problems. As a result of these problems, the economy faced a capital outflow in November 2000. In defending the peg, the central bank lost around US$5 billion within two weeks. At the brink of collapse, the program was saved temporarily by an IMF bailout of US$7.5 billion. Nonetheless, the ensuing turmoil devastated the market for government debt instruments, preventing it from attracting foreign or domestic capital. Meanwhile, the banks were holding illiquid assets in the form of government debt instruments and relying on short-term borrowing to finance their portfolios. Hence, they began facing increasing difficulties, as their balance sheets continued to deteriorate. As short-term capital was withdrawn from the money markets, interest rates soared. This increased the perception that the exchange rate regime was about to collapse.
In February 2001, just four months before the exit day of the crawling peg, a dispute between Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer over how to fight public-sector corruption triggered a severe financial crisis. Initially, the central bank used up one-third of its international reserves to protect the crawling peg. The Istanbul Stock Exchange experienced an 18 percent decline in one day and overnight interest rates approached 7,000 percent on an annualized basis. Hence, banks were unable to borrow in the overnight market, and the payments system came to a standstill. As a result, the Turkish central bank abandoned the crawling peg and switched to a floating exchange rate system. This resulted in a 40 percent devaluation of the Turkish lira. Eventually, a US$15 billion fund secured by a new agreement with the IMF in May 2001 stopped the lira's fall. With the collapse of the crawling peg, Turkey embarked on a new and intensified IMF-backed adjustment program, which granted the Turkish central bank independence from political authority.
The Turkish economy since 2001 has been characterized by increased inflows of speculative capital. As a result of the overabundance of the foreign exchange supplied by international investors, the lira has become overvalued. As the Turkish central bank has restricted its monetary policies only to control inflation, it has left the value of the lira to be determined by the speculative decisions of the market forces. Hence, in the first half of March 2006, when global financial markets suffered wide-ranging turmoil and shortage of liquidity, the Turkish economy saw sharp declines in currency, equity, and bond markets. In only two weeks, the Istanbul Stock Exchange lost 6.5 percent and the value of the Turkish lira dropped by about 20 percent against the U.S. dollar. The central bank calmed the market by increasing interest rates in two separate extraordinary monetary policy committee meetings. Nonetheless, due to the dependence of the Turkish economy on capital inflows, the economy is still vulnerable to speculative attacks.
Theoretical Framework
The present paper is based on a parsimonious second generation-type speculative attack model introduced by Sachs et al. (1996) . The model suggests that an economy is more likely to experience a currency crisis if the real exchange is appreciated, the banking system is fragile, and the level of international reserves does not sufficiently cover liquid liabilities. The model is a second generation-type theoretical framework, as it considers the possibility of multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling prophecies in the financial markets . It considers a small open economy with a pegged exchange rate. The real exchange rate is shown as E 0 /P, where E 0 denotes the nominal exchange rate and P denotes the ratio of the domestic price level to the foreign price level, which is taken as predetermined in the short term. For simplicity, P is set to unity (P = 1). As long as net capital outflow (K) is smaller than or equal to international reserves (R), no devaluation occurs. Otherwise, a devaluation takes place and the government establishes a new nominal exchange rate (E T ) to achieve a target real exchange rate. Thus,
where E 1 is the next-period exchange rate. The size of the devaluation is shown as
Thus,
where E T reflects, inter alia, the health of the banking system. If the banking sector is not fragile, the government sets E T = e, where e denotes the long-run real exchange rate since P = 1. If the banking sector is fragile, the government refrains from setting high interest rates to defend the exchange rate. In the latter case, it chooses a real exchange rate more depreciated than e to not cause bankruptcies among banks. E T therefore depends on
where BSF denotes banking-sector fragility. 1 Thus, the potential course of the exchange rate can be shown as
which suggests that a devaluation occurs when there is a capital outflow in excess of reserve levels. The size of the devaluation reaches its peak when the exchange rate is initially appreciated relative to its long-run average, so that e/E is high, or if f (BSF) is large. In the model, the possibility of multiple equilibria arises because capital movements depend on anticipated exchange rate behavior . The capital outflow depends on the expectation of a devaluation, whereas the devaluation depends on a capital outflow. Sachs et al. (1996) illustrate where there are N small investors who each hold assets, k, in the banking system of the country. If all investors flee the country with all their funds, the size of the incipient capital outflow is K = Nk. Investors decide to withdraw funds in the event that a devaluation, D, is expected to exceed a percentage, θ, and maintain funds in the country as long as D is expected to be less than or equal to θ. Therefore, for investor j,
By symmetry, total capital outflows are
If the fundamentals are healthy:
If the real exchange rate is not overvalued and banks are not bankrupt, (e/E 0 ) f (BSF) -1 could be very close to zero. Therefore, the condition (e/E 0 ) f (BSF) -1 ≤ θ could be satisfied even if θ is small. When this condition applies, any devaluation would be smaller than the investors' threshold for capital flight. Therefore, even in the event of a devaluation, K = 0. As K = 0 < R, there is no devaluation. On the other hand, if the fundamentals are unhealthy, then
in which case a devaluation would be larger than the investors' threshold. Therefore, K = Nk if a devaluation does in fact occur. Sachs et al. (1996) explain that there is a region of multiple equilibria where a devaluation may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If K = Nk < R, then the government can defend the exchange rate against a capital outflow and a speculative attack is fended off. On the other hand, if K = Nk > R, the occurrence of devaluation depends on investors' expectations. If each investor expects exchange rate stability (D = 0), then each keeps k equal to zero and no devaluation occurs. But if each investor expects a devaluation, however, then K = Nk > R and D > θ. Therefore, there exists a region of multiple equilibria where a devaluation may be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
In sum, the model suggests that if an economy has bad fundamentals-that is, an overvalued real exchange rate or a fragile banking system-as well as a low level of international reserves relative to liquid liabilities, it will be "the likely victim of a currency crisis" (Sachs et al. 1996, p. 9) . Although the present theoretical framework is based on a pegged exchange rate regime, it holds for the Turkish economy for the entire period under study, during which an official peg was not in effect at all times: A managed float was implemented between 1993 and 2000 and a free float was implemented following the currency crisis of 2001. Yet it has been widely argued that the declared official exchange rate regimes in Turkey hardly have reflected the real policies of the Turkish central bank, which has always intervened to keep the exchange rate within certain bands regardless of the prevailing official exchange rate regime.
2 Considering this, the present paper employs an exchange market pressure index that holds over all types of exchange rate regimes.
Data
Data used in the present study are monthly, spanning the period August 1989 to August 2006, and were obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics and the electronic data delivery system of Turkey's central bank.
In a floating exchange rate regime, selling pressure in the exchange market is measured easily because the exchange rate change fully reflects the pressure on the exchange rate. However, under a pegged exchange rate, the exchange rate change alone does not sufficiently reflect the pressure. In this case, speculative attacks on the exchange rate are reflected through the action taken by the monetary authorities. To prevent depreciation of the currency, the central bank may either sell international reserves or increase interest rates. Eichengreen et al. (1995) suggest a model-independent exchange market pressure (EMP) index, which is applicable under all exchange rate regimes. The index consists of weighted averages of normalized changes in the exchange rate, the ratio of international reserves to M1, and the nominal interest rates. The EMP in period t is calculated as follows:
where α, β, and γ are the weights-the inverse of the standard deviation of e t , (i t -i * t ), and r t , respectively. They are used to equalize the volatilities of the three components and to prevent the component with the highest volatility from dominating the index (Eichengreen et al. 1995) . The value Δ denotes monthly percent change, e t denotes the equally weighted Turkish lira/deutsche mark 3 -Turkish lira/U.S. dollar nominal exchange rate basket, i denotes the domestic interest rate (three-month deposit rate), 4 i* t corresponds to the same variable but for the United States (three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate), and r t denotes the ratio of international reserves (net of gold) to M1. A positive value of the index indicates increased pressure in the exchange market, which can stem from any combination of a devaluation, an expansion of the interest rate spread, or a loss of international reserves.
The three explanatory variables are calculated as follows. Overvaluation of the real exchange rate (RER) is estimated as
where REER is the consumer price index-based real effective exchange rate index calculated by the Turkish central bank using the IMF weights for nineteen countries (1995 = 0). An increase in the index shows an appreciation of the Turkish lira.
Banking sector fragility (BSFI) is measured by an index suggested by Kibritciog¬ lu (2003) . The index consists of a weighted average of bank credits to the domestic private sector, bank deposits, and banks' foreign liabilities. The index is calculated as (12) where Δ indicates twelve-month percentage changes in data. The values CPS, FL, and DEP stand for credits to the domestic private sector, the foreign liabilities of banks, and bank deposits, respectively. Kibritciog¬ lu (2003) argues that an increase in the index indicates the excessive risk-taking behavior of banks and, therefore, an increased fragility in the banking sector.
International reserves (IRM) are considered relative to M2 as a ratio of M2 to international reserves. This is because if capital inflows reverse for any reason, the central bank must be prepared to cover all its liquid liabilities with its international reserves to avoid a sharp depreciation (Calvo 1995) . M2 is a broad measure of liquid liabilities, which include not only direct liabilities-monetary base and short-term government bonds-but also the liquid liabilities of banks. Thus, it is considered as a yardstick for comparing the level of reserves (Sachs et al. 1997 ). An increase in the ratio of M2 to international reserves indicates increased vulnerability to crises.
Methodology
The ARDL model accounts for a one-period lagged error-correction term, which does not have restricted error corrections. Hence, the ARDL approach involves estimating the following unrestricted error-correction model (UECM):
where Δ is the difference operator, p represents the lag structure, Y t and X t are the underlying variables, and ε 1t and ε 2t are serially independent random errors with mean zero and finite covariance matrix. In Equation (13), where ΔY t is the dependent variable, the null hypothesis is that H 0 : σ 1Y = σ 2Y = 0-that is, there exists no long-run equilibrium relationship. The alternative hypothesis is H 1 : σ 1Y ≠ 0, σ 2Y ≠ 0. Similarly, in Equation (14), where ΔX t is the dependent variable, the null hypothesis is H 0 : ω 1Y = ω 2Y = 0-that is, there exists no long-run equilibrium relationship. The alternative hypothesis is that Pesaran et al. 2001 ). These hypotheses are tested using the F-test and t-tests. These tests have nonstandard distributions that depend on the sample size, the inclusion of intercept and trend variables in the equation, and the number of regressors. Pesaran et al. (2001) discuss five cases with different restrictions on the trends and intercepts. The present analysis considers three of these cases. The estimated ARDL test statistics are compared to two asymptotic critical values reported in Pesaran et al. (2001, pp. 300-304) rather than the conventional critical values. If the test statistic is above an upper critical value, the null hypothesis of no long-run relation can be rejected regardless of the orders of integration of the underlying variables. The opposite is the case if the test statistic falls below a lower critical value. If the sample test statistic falls between these two bounds, the result is inconclusive. Groenewold and Tang (2007) suggest that Granger causality tests are applicable regardless of the orders of integration of the underlying variables if it has been established that there exists a long-run equilibrium relation between the underlying series. However, in the presence of such a relation, the Granger causality test requires the inclusion of a lagged error-correction term within a vector error-correction model (VECM) to capture the short-run deviations of the series from their long-run equilibrium relation (Narayan and Smyth 2004) . Accordingly, Granger causality analysis within the VECM involves estimating the following models:
where
(see Narayan and Smyth 2004, p. 290 ).
In the above representations, L denotes the lag operator, which implies that (L)ΔZ t = ΔZ t-1 . ECT t-1 denotes the one-period lagged error-correction term, and m 1t and m 2t represent serially independent random errors with mean zero and finite covariance matrix (Narayan and Smyth 2004) . In Equation (15), ΔY t is regressed on its own lagged values and the lagged values of ΔX t , whereas the opposite is the case in Equation (16). In both equations, ECT t-1 captures the speed of adjustment of the variables in response to a deviation from their long-run equilibrium path. The significance of the differenced explanatory variables based on F-statistics indicates the existence of short-term causal effects, whereas the significance of ECT t-1 , based on t-statistics, indicates the existence of a long-term relationship.
Empirical Results
The ARDL bounds-testing procedure yields valid results regardless of the levels of integrations of the underlying variables, provided that none of the series is integrated of order 2 or higher. Therefore, augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and more powerful Phillips-Perron (PP) tests are used to ensure that all series are either I(0) or I (1) . In the tests, the lag length and bandwidth are selected with the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Newey-West Bartlett kernel, respectively. Table 1 reports the results of the unit-root tests. Evidence suggests that the series are a mix of I(1) and I(0) processes. Thus, the ARDL bounds testing procedure is applicable. Table 2 reports the critical bounds reported in Pesaran et al. (2001) for the case in which there are two regressors in the ARDL models (k = 2). In the table, F η denotes the critical F-statistic of the model with unrestricted intercept and no trend, F θ denotes the critical Fstatistic of the model with unrestricted intercept and restricted trend, and F π denotes the (1) I (0) I (1) Notes: t T represents the most general model with a drift and trend; t m is the model with a drift and without trend; t is the most restricted model without a drift and trend. Numbers in parentheses are the lag lengths and the bandwidths. * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 percent level. Source: Pesaran et al. (2001, pp. 300-304) .
critical F-statistic of the model with unrestricted intercept and trend. The value t η denotes the critical t-statistic of the model with unrestricted intercept and no trend, and t π represents the critical t-statistics of the model with unrestricted intercept and trend. Table 3 reports the results of Equations (13) and (14) for each of the hypothesized relations. The representation of the tested hypotheses on the table is such that F EMP Pesaran et al. 2001 ).
(EMP | RER) denotes the null hypothesis H 0 : σ 1EMP = σ 2EMP = 0, where RER is a long-run forcing variable for EMP, whereas, F RER (RER | EMP) represents the opposite case-the null hypothesis is H 0 : ω 1RER = ω 2RER = 0; that is, EMP is a long-run forcing variable for RER. In each case, the optimum lag-length (p) selection is based on minimizing the AIC and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (see Atkins and Serletis 2003) . The models are estimated through ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The results in Table 3 suggest rejecting the null hypothesis of no long-run relation in each case, regardless of whether EMP is the dependent variable or not. Thus, the evidence suggested by the ARDL bounds test supports the theory that EMP is in a long-run equilibrium-level relation with BSFI, RER, and MIR over the sample period. However, this is a necessary but insufficient condition to establish a causal relationship (Morley 2006) . The existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship among the underlying variables suggests that there must be Granger causality in at least one direction. However, it does not reveal the direction of temporal causality between the variables (Narayan and Smyth 2005) . Thus, Granger causality tests based on VECM are estimated to identify the direction of causal effects.
Rather than following the mainstream lag-length selection criteria, VECMs are estimated for up to four lags to make sure that the results are not sensitive to the choice of the lag length (see Katircioglu 2009) . From the coefficients of the differenced explanatory variable, the magnitude and the direction of the causal relation between the explained and the explanatory variables can be inferred (Groenewold and Tang 2007) . In addition, the magnitude of the lagged error-correction term, ECT t-1 , indicates the speed of adjustment from a short-run disequilibrium.
Regarding the short-and long-run Granger causality, the significance of the differenced explanatory variables based on F-statistics indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis under investigation, which means that short-term Granger causality exists. The significance of the coefficient of ECT t-1 , based on t-statistics, indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis under investigation, which means that a long-term causal relationship exists (Narayan and Smyth 2004) . Table 4 reports the result of the short-and long-run Granger causality tests within the VECM. Beginning with the short-run effects, the coefficients of the differenced explanatory variables RER, MIR, and BSFI are significant at the 1 percent level, which suggests rejecting the hypothesis of no Granger causality. Thus, in the long run, there exists strong causality running from all three variables to EMP. The results are consistent at all tested lags and the coefficients have negative signs, in line with Sachs et al. (1996) . As Table 4 shows, evidence also suggests that the causal relationship between EMP and BSFI is unidirectional and that a strong feedback relationship exists between these two variables in the long run. Examining the coefficients suggests that the causal effect of EMP on BSFI is much less than that of BSFI on EMP. The signs of the coefficients reveal that EMP has a negative causal effect on BSFI. This is because banks are more likely to engage in risk-taking activities, such as expanding their loan portfolios and increasing their exposure to exchange rate risk through increasing their foreign liabilities when their analysts observe a decline in exchange market pressure.
Turning to long-run effects, the coefficient of the lagged error-correction term is significant in all cases regardless of the direction of the causality in the tested hypothesis. In all three cases, the coefficient of the lagged error-correction term is quite high, suggesting that convergence to the long-run equilibrium path following a shock is fast. Notes: The numbers in parentheses are, respectively, the estimated F-statistics and t-statistics for the coefficients of the lagged error-correction term (d) and the differenced explanatory variable (y). p denotes the lag length. * denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
Overall, the evidence obtained from the Granger causality analysis within VECM confirms the findings from the ARDL bounds test, that there exists a long-run equilibrium relation between EMP and the tested explanatory variables. Therefore, the econometric analysis has yielded evidence in line with Sachs et al. (1996) .
Conclusions
This paper has investigated the nature of the relationship among exchange market pressure and real exchange rate overvaluation, banking-sector fragility, and the level of international reserves in Turkey in the postcapital account liberalization period. Strong evidence has emerged to support the existence of long-run causality running from banking-sector fragility, international reserves relative to liquid liabilities, and real exchange rate overvaluation to exchange market pressure in Turkey. The findings also suggest the existence of a feedback relation in the case of banking-sector fragility and exchange market pressure.
Overall, the findings suggest that speculative attacks in Turkey can be explained through the second generation-type theoretical model suggested by Sachs et al. (1996) . In this respect, the evidence that M2 and reserves Granger cause exchange market pressure supports the hypothesis of Calvo (1995) that a high ratio of M2 to international reserves makes countries more vulnerable to speculative attacks. Similarly, the finding that real exchange rate appreciation Granger causes exchange market pressure supports the hypothesis proposed by Dornbusch et al. (1995) that real exchange rate appreciation increases the likelihood of financial crisis. The existence of bidirectional causality between exchange market pressure and banking-sector fragility supports the twin-crises hypothesis of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) , who suggest that currency crises and banking crises exist in a vicious cycle, feeding on each other. As evident from the negative causal effect of exchange market pressure on banking-sector fragility, banks tend to engage in risk-taking activities when there seems to be no currency crisis ahead. This leads to an increased likelihood of currency crisis. This affirms the validity of the twin-crises hypothesis in Turkey.
These results are consistent with the findings of several earlier empirical studies on the root causes of currency crises in Turkey, such as Kibritciog¬ lu et al. (1998) , who identified the exchange rate as a leading indicator of the 1994 crisis based on the signals approach; Mariano et al. (2004) , who found that exchange rate and international reserves were among the determinants of the crisis in 2001 based on a Markov regime-switching model; and Özkan (2005) , who offered empirical evidence that the weakness of the financial sector was among the reasons for the 2001 crisis.
The policy implication that emerges from the present study is the importance of carefully monitoring banking-sector variables and maintaining a level of international reserves sufficient to cover liquid liabilities. Nevertheless, previous crisis experiences have also shown that economies, especially emerging markets, may be susceptible to speculative attacks, regardless of whether fundamentals are healthy or not. Investor sentiment and self-fulfilling prophecies may also lead to speculative pressure and a subsequent currency crisis. Therefore, policymakers and financial institutions alike are advised to set up financial safety nets, which could assist in mitigating the potential costs associated with unanticipated speculative attacks and an ensuing potential currency crisis.
